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I develop a new theory of persuasive advertising in which consumers rationally adjust to 
(i.e., improve their attitude toward) the products they choose and advertising facilitates 
adjustment. Advertising’s price effects depend on whether marginal or inframarginal 
consumers are most heavily targeted, consistent with the literature. But they also 
depend on advertising’s role as an overall adjustment intensifier, whence variation in the 
cost of adjustment with the strength of the consumer’s initial product preference 
determines the equilibrium price level. Whether too much or too little advertising is 
provided in equilibrium depends on the sign and size of advertising’s price effect, the 
relative density of marginal consumers, and the relative extent to which advertising’s 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
 Advertising is like aspirin: while it is known to work, its functional mechanism is still 
not entirely clear. The two leading economic theories as to why consumers respond to 
advertising both have significant limitations. 
 One theory holds that advertising is persuasive, altering consumers’ tastes for a firm’s 
product and spuriously creating product differentiation.1 Persuasive advertising is typically 
modeled as increasing demand, making demand more inelastic, or both. But such notions are 
at odds with the prevailing economic view that consumers’ tastes are fixed; and, more 
broadly speaking, the persuasion theory offers no explanation as to why advertising should 
elicit a response at all from a rational consumer. 
 The other leading theory holds that advertising is informative. According to its 
conception, advertising influences consumers to the extent that it provides useful information 
of some kind on the product - its features, price, availability, and so forth. Even advertising 
messages that appear non-substantive (e.g., image-oriented) convey the information that the 
product is advertised and must be of sufficient quality to have elicited a costly advertising 
expenditure (Nelson 1974). But the information theory cannot explain the efforts devoted to 
the crafting of message and image in ads otherwise devoid of informational content. If the 
purpose is just to show that money is being spent and the ad is not in some measure intended 
to be persuasive, why should such details matter? 
 This paper presents a new theory of advertising as assisting self-persuasion. The 
theory is based on the conception of a consumer who rationally adjusts to the choices she 
makes. That is, it assumes a consumer who does not simply make utility-maximizing choices 
                                                
1 For a more extensive discussion of the theory of advertising as well as a literature survey, see Bagwell (2007). 
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but additionally, and simultaneously, invests effort to increase the utility obtained conditional 
on her choice. This proposition is built on extensive recent psychological research showing 
that consumers routinely undergo a sort of mental re-positioning relative to choices they have 
made, changing both their stated preferences and the physiological manifestations of their 
hedonic responses.2 Indeed, it is common sense that a person should work to get comfortable 
with the inevitable, and this is something that, introspection suggests, we all do to the extent 
we find we are able. Advertising, in this context, provides the persuasive ammunition that 
consumers need to get themselves “psyched up” about the product. Such a conception of 
advertising as a tool for the consumer is consistent with the Elaboration Likelihood Model, 
which considers the conditions under which consumers approach advertising with active 
thinking as a part of their decision-making process (Petty and Cacioppo 1986). Separately, 
studies of cognitive dissonance reveal that consumers actively seek persuasive advertising 
messages that have the potential to reduce doubts about product choices (Ehrlich et al. 1957, 
Mills 1965).3 
 I posit a Hotelling model of differentiated product competition in which consumers 
differ as to their initial tastes for two competing products. A consumer can, at a cost, adjust to 
the product he intends to choose – in essence, “moving closer” to it, and thereby avoiding 
some of the transportation cost associated with imperfect taste matching. Advertising for a 
particular product is modeled generally as reducing the cost of such adjustment. By 
                                                
2 Studies offering evidence of preference change based solely on subject ratings of chosen alternatives include 
Lieberman et al. (2001), Kitayama et al. (2004), Sharot et al. (2010), and Wakslak (2012). Studies that 
additionally measured changes using functional magnetic resource imaging (fMRI) of subjects’ brains include 
Sharot et al. (2009), van Veen et al. (2009), Izuma et al. (2010), Jarcho et al. (2011), Qin et al. (2011), Kitayama 
et al. (2013), and Izuma and Adolphs (2013). 
3 Advertising is also conceived as a consumer tool in the uses and gratifications literature: see O’Donohoe 
(1994), Ko et al. (2005), Aitken et al. (2008), and Phillips and McQuarrie (2010). Advertising in the model 
moreover may be viewed as a stand-in for other forms of costly marketing communication, particularly 
salesperson communications to customers, which have been discussed as facilitating post-purchase dissonance 
reduction. See Hunt (1970), Milliman and Decker (1990), and Grewal and Sharma (1991). 
 3 
incorporating adjustment as a step in a model of rational choice, the theory allows the 
induced outcomes to be subsumed into “final” preferences such that the conventional 
techniques for analyzing choices (including the axioms of revealed preference) may be 
applied to them. This approach avoids many of the complications associated with previous 
efforts to model taste change. 
 Though adjustment implies intensification of preference, prices do not rise 
unambiguously with advertising. Advertising’s effects accrue to its roles as a shaper of 
relative adjustment facility levels across consumers (i.e., it has the potential to reduce the 
relative marginal adjustment costs experienced by consumers with stronger or weaker initial 
product preferences, thereby skewing price levels) and overall intensifier of adjustment (i.e., 
in reducing adjustment costs, advertising causes more adjustment by consumers across the 
board and so intensifies adjustment’s own effects on prices). The sign of the latter effect in 
turn depends on how consumers’ facility with adjustment varies based on the strength of their 
initial product preference. 
 While firms’ motivations to advertise accrue to their interest in increasing sales at the 
margin and increasing profit on inframarginal consumers through increased prices, 
consumers’ benefits from advertising accrue to the reduction in their adjustment costs. In 
general, these goals are not aligned, whence it is found that advertising may be over- or 
under-provided in equilibrium. Factors affecting the balance include advertising’s price 
effect, the density of consumers at the margin between the firms, and the relative extent to 
which adjustment cost reductions benefit marginal consumers relative to the overall mass of 
consumers. 
 4 
 The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section II introduces the model. 
Section III derives the equilibrium. Section IV relates the level of advertising that results in 
equilibrium to the social welfare-optimizing level. Section V concludes and discusses 
opportunities for future research. The Appendix contains proofs and derivations of all 
lemmas and propositions. 
 
II. THE MODEL 
 
 Consider two products, indexed 0 and 1, each produced by an independent firm 
correspondingly named. The firms are located at opposite ends of a segment of length 1 
representing the product space. Following Hotelling’s model (1929), each consumer is 
characterized by a location x ∈ 0,1[ ] , identifying his relative taste for the two products. 
Consumers are assumed distributed on this segment according to an arbitrary distribution 
function F with full support and continuous density function f. They buy at most one unit of a 
single product. I assume the baseline utility of a consumer at x buying product j to be given 
by 
(1) Ux =V − pj − t x − j   
where V is the common reservation price for the product, pj  is the price of product j, and t 
parameterizes the utility loss due to j’s not being the consumer’s ideal choice – the standard 
“transportation” cost, linear in the consumer’s distance from j. 
 Suppose that the consumer faces the possibility of adjusting to a product, defined as 
relocating on the segment to be closer to it, thereby paying less transportation cost. The 
process is quite naturally viewed as an incremental one, involving incremental investment of 
costly or aversive effort that pays off with an incremental improvement in attitude toward the 
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product. In this context, let us conceive of advertising for a given product as making such 
adjustment easier with respect to that product, that is, improving the consumer’s product-
specific technology of adjustment so that the same amount of attitude improvement toward 
the product may be achieved at lower cost. These concepts are represented by the following 
adjustment marginal cost function associated with product j, 
(2) g j i, x,Aj( ) ≡ φ Aj( )g j ,1 i, x( ) + 1−φ Aj( )⎡⎣ ⎤⎦g j ,0 i, x( )   
where i is the distance from x and closer to j’s position, g j ,k i, x( ) > 0  ∀x,i  for j,k = 0,1 , and 
Aj  represents firm j’s advertising expenditure. Here we let the g
j ,k .( )  be continuous on their 
support with g j ,k i, x( )  increasing and strictly convex in i (i.e., gij ,k > 0  and giij ,k > 0 ) and 
lim
i→x
g0,k i, x( ) = ∞  (and lim
i→1−x
g1,k i, x( ) = ∞ ). We make the following assumptions about 
advertising’s effects on the marginal cost of adjustment: 
 
ASSUMPTION 1: φ .( )  is continuous on its support. 
ASSUMPTION 2: φ .( )  is increasing and strictly concave. 
ASSUMPTION 3: lim
Aj→∞
φ Aj( ) = 1 . 
ASSUMPTION 4 (Advertising-driven dominance): g j ,1 i, x( ) < g j ,0 i, x( )  ∀i > 0 , x ∈ 0,1[ ] , for 
j = 0,1 . 
 
 Notice the generality of the formulation. Advertising is conceived as reducing 
product-specific adjustment costs asymptotically from a zero-advertising level given by 
g j ,0 i, x( )  toward a limit (lower bound) given by g j ,1 i, x( ) . Other than Assumption 4, there is 
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no restriction on the shape of g j ,1 i, x( )  relative to g j ,0 i, x( ) . Advertising generally does not 
affect all consumers equally; some may experience greater relative effects, seeing their 
marginal adjustment costs reduced more than others if, say, the advertising “targets” them. 
 One may view the function g j .( )  as representing a set of adjustment curves 
 G
j := g j i( ) = g j i, x( ) : x ∈ 0,1[ ]{ }  characterized by differing values of x, whereby each curve 
represents the cost, at each state of attitude improvement i, of incremental “movement 
toward” j for the consumer located initially at x. Let us refer to  G
j  as an adjustment map for 
product j. Figure 1 illustrates an adjustment map for product 0. Figure 2 displays the 
adjustment map  G
0  along with pre-advertising and limiting adjustment maps for product 0. 
< INSERT FIGURES 1 & 2 APPROXIMATELY HERE > 
 Whereas Assumption 4 sets forth the intuitive notion that advertising for a product 
makes consumers no worse at adjusting to it and perhaps better, the next assumption reflects 
the same idea with respect to relative preference for products: 
 
ASSUMPTION 5 (Preference dominance): For all x ∈ 0,1[ ] , − ∂g0∂x < ∂g
0






That is, the more preferred a product is initially, the lower the marginal cost of adjustment at 
any particular location achieved through accumulated adjustment. This “dominance” 
condition implies that a person who initially prefers a product more than another person finds 
it less costly to achieve a given attitude toward that product through adjustment than the 
other person. This gives rise to adjustment maps of non-crossing nested contours, similar to 
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well-behaved indifference maps. It follows that adjustment results in a better “net” attitude 
the greater the individual’s initial proximity to a product. 
 For consumers for whom adjusting to a given product is preferred over leaving one’s 
attitude unchanged, one can speak of adjustment productivity: how much attitude 
improvement with respect to the product the consumer will attain, given his preferences, his 
particular capabilities at adjusting to it, and the transportation cost (i.e., his opportunity cost 
of adjusting). Define the set Xj t( ) := x :g j ,0 0, x( ) < t{ } ; since g j ,0 0, x( ) , while continuous, is 
not required to be monotonic in x, Xj t( )  may contain (compact) gaps. One may then define 
the implicit function i* j ,0 x,t( )  on  Xj t( )× t > 0{ }→ !
+  such that g j ,0 i* j ,0 x,t( ), x( ) = t  as 
consumer x’s “adjustment productivity given t.” One may similarly define i* j ,1 x,t( )  and 
i* j x,t,Aj ,r( )  based on g j ,1 i* j ,1 x,t( ), x( ) = t  and g j i* j x,t,Aj ,r( ), x,Aj ,r( ) = t , respectively. 
Note that, for x ∉Xj t( ) , i* j ,0 x,t( ) = 0 . Thus the adjustment model nests non-adjustment as a 
sub-case (i.e., Xj t( ) = φ ). 
 The following lemma advances some useful results that follow from the definition of 
adjustment productivity: 
 
LEMMA 1: (i) ix
*0 <1 (and ix
*1 > −1); (ii) iA0
*0 ≥ 0  (and iA1
*1 ≥ 0 ); (iii) lim
A0→∞
iA0




*1 = 0 ); (iv) it
*0 = 1 g
i*0
0 > 0  (and it
*1 = 1 g
i*1
1 > 0 ). 
 
 Accounting for adjustment, the utility of a consumer at x buying product 0 is given by 
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(3) U0 =V − p0 − t x − i
*0 x,A0( )⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ − g0 i, x,A0( )di
0
i*0 x,A0 ,r( )
∫   
and, for a consumer at x buying product 1, by 
(4) U1 =V − p1 − t 1− x − i
*1 x,A1( )⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ − g1 i, x,A1( )di
0
i*1 x,A1,r( )
∫   
One can see that utility losses accruing to choosing a non-ideal product equal the sum of 
adjustment cost and transportation cost components and are a function of the consumer’s 
adjustment productivity. Figure 3 displays these losses graphically as areas under the 
adjustment and transportation cost curves.4 
< INSERT FIGURE 3 APPROXIMATELY HERE > 
 Following Bloch and Manceau (1999), but extended to the adjustment case, I impose 
what is in effect a restriction on the size of V relative to t and to the rate of change of g0,0  
with respect to x: 
 












F x( )  is increasing for all x ∈ 0,1[ ] . 
 
The assumption is a sufficient condition for the market to be covered under adjustment, as 
stated by the following lemma: 
 
LEMMA 2: Given Assumption 6, the market is covered in equilibrium. 
                                                
4 Note that the setup in (3) and (4) is isomorphic to a traditional Hotelling model with nonlinear transportation 
costs. The adjustment map construct adds value relative to such a model by making the costs accruing to 
adjustment (as opposed to “transportation”) structurally and visually explicit so that adjustment’s distinct effects 
are clearly visible. 
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 To simplify the analysis and avoid corner cases, the analysis of advertising will be 
performed in the context of the following minimally-restrictive assumption about consumers’ 
adjustment productivity: 
 
ASSUMPTION 7 (Strong adjustment feasibility): Let x*  be the location of the indifferent 
consumer when there is no adjustment.5 Then x*,1⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ ⊂ X0 t( )  and, correspondingly, 
0, x*⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ ⊂ X1 t( ) . 
 
This assumption provides that all consumers have the incentive to adjust to at least one 
product, and moreover that all consumers that a firm might target with its advertising (i.e., 
marginal, or else inframarginal to its rival) have positive adjustment productivity with respect 
to its product. Given this assumption, advertising does not need to be expended to bring 
consumers to the point where adjustment becomes feasible; rather its purpose is to improve 
the adjustment productivity of consumers who are already at least minimally productive at 
adjustment. 
 The location xE
*  of the indifferent consumer under adjustment can be derived by 
setting U0 =U1 . Thus it is defined implicitly by` 
(5) 
Θ xE
* ,t, p0, p1,A0,A1,r( ) ≡ p1 − p0 + t − 2txE* − t i*1 xE* ,t,A1,r( )− i*0 xE* ,t,A0,r( )⎡⎣ ⎤⎦





∫ − g0 i, xE* ,A0,r( )di
0
i*0 xE
* ,A0 ,r( )
∫ = 0
  
                                                
5 The existence of an x*  is guaranteed by Lemma 2. 
 10 
Based on this, one may define market shares for the two products as D0 = F xE
*( )  and 
D1 = 1− F xE
*( ) . 
 There are two periods. At t = 1 , firms choose advertising expenditures, taking each 
other’s advertising expenditure choices as given. At t = 2 , they choose prices, taking each 
other’s prices and their previous advertising choices as given. Firms recognize that their 
prices and their rivals’ prices will depend on their prior advertising choices and so treat these 
strategically with respect to their advertising decisions in t = 1 . At the end of t = 2 , 
consumers choose products and adjust to the product they choose; they receive utility, and 
the firms earn profits. I seek subgame perfect Nash equilibria to this game. 
 Given demand, profits of the firms are given by 
(6) 
Π0 = p0 A0,A1( )F xE*( )− aA0
Π1 = p1 A0,A1( ) 1− F xE*( ){ }− aA1
  
where I specify a as the unit cost of advertising. 
 As a final assumption, I employ a variant on a distributional restriction by Caplin and 
Nalebuff (1991), which they showed constitutes a sufficient condition for the existence of a 
unique equilibrium in a broad class of games. Bloch and Manceau (1999) demonstrated the 
use of the Caplin-Nalebuff assumption in a model of persuasive advertising. The present 
variant generalizes that assumption to the model involving adjustment by imposing a set of 
complementary restrictions on the consumer distribution f and the adjustment functions g j ,k . 
In the Appendix, it is demonstrated that the assumption applies to a rather general set of f and 
g functional form combinations. 
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 I begin by establishing a standard equilibrium existence result for the advertising and 
pricing game played by the firms and then derive the effect of advertising on prices as a 
comparative static result that characterizes the equilibrium. Equilibrium in the two-stage 
game is solved by backward induction: one first must determine the Nash equilibrium price-
setting strategies of the firms in t = 2 , then the t = 1  advertising strategies that take account 
of the t = 2  decisions. I obtain the following:6 
 
PROPOSITION 1: Assume the following hold: (i) the initial marginal productivity of 
advertising φAj Aj=0





























* ,A0 ,r( )































∫ . Then the two-period game in which firms 
choose advertising levels at t = 1  and price levels contingent on these at t = 2  has a unique 




*( )  at which A0*,A1* > 0 , p0* = −F xE*( ) f xE*( ) ∂xE*∂ p0 , 
and p1
* = 1− F xE
*( )⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ f xE*( ) ∂xE
*
∂ p1 .  
 
                                                
6 All proofs of propositions are in the Appendix. 
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 The intuition behind pre-conditions (i) and (ii) on the function φ  is straightforward: 
(i) is necessary if at least some advertising is to be profitable in equilibrium, given 
advertising’s positive incremental cost; and (ii) ensures the uniqueness of each firm’s 
optimizing advertising level. Pre-condition (iii) is essentially a requirement that the marginal 
revenue product of advertising for firm 0 be positive. (Pre-condition (iv) states the same for 
firm 1.) It represents the balance of the two relevant effects of advertising on firm 0’s 
revenues – effects that are related to two competing influences that advertising has with 
respect to consumer adjustment. The left-hand side comprises an expression, weighted by 
1− F xE
*( )⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ f xE*( ) , that reflects how advertising, via the structure of the adjustment map, 
influences the price sensitivity of demand. I will interpret the components of this expression 
in detail later in discussing Proposition 2. Advertising induces the firm’s rival to raise price 
when the left-hand side is positive and to cut price when it is negative. The right-hand side of 
(iii) comprises the effect of advertising on the accumulated adjustment costs of the marginal 
consumer. In effect, it represents advertising’s direct effect on firm 0’s sales under the Nash 
conjecture that firm 1’s advertising expenditure will be held constant. The sign of the effect 
is always negative; correspondingly, the direct effect of advertising on sales is always 
positive. For (iii) to be satisfied, then, it is necessary that the effect of firm 0’s advertising in 
inducing firm 1 to reduce price must not be large relative to the effect of the advertising in 
marginally increasing firm 0’s sales directly. Otherwise, advertising in any amount will not 
be profitable to the firm. 
 Now let us turn to advertising’s price effect in equilibrium. It is sufficient to consider 
the effect of varying the exogenous unit cost of adjustment-facilitating advertising, a. I 
eliminate sectoral effects by confining the analysis to a context in which both demand and 
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adjustment are symmetric with respect to products. Taking the price function 

























Signing the expression, one obtains the following result: 
 
PROPOSITION 2: Assume (1) f x( ) = f 1− x( )  and (2) 
g0,k i, x( ) = g1,k i,1− x( )∀i ≥ 0, x ∈ 0,1[ ] . Then, advertising’s effect on prices is the sum of: 
(i) a shaping effect, arising from altering how consumers’ adjustment facility varies 
with the strength of initial product preference; and 
(ii) an intensification effect, arising from advertising’s amplification of adjustment’s 
effect on price based on the existing adjustment map. 

























*1 < 0 ) and decreases them if the inequalities are reversed. 
 
 Proposition 2 shows that advertising affects prices by influencing consumers’ 
technology of self-persuasion in two ways. First, advertising changes the shape of the 
adjustment map, that is, it alters how marginal adjustment costs vary across consumers. I 
refer to this effect as the “shaping effect.” The solid red and solid blue adjustment maps in 
Figure 4 illustrate an example of the shaping effect: movement from the former to the latter 
                                                
7 It is straightforward to show that a affects pj  only through advertising (i.e., there is no direct effect). 
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represents advertising that reduces marginal adjustment costs relatively more for consumers 
with less intense initial product preferences (i.e., marginal consumers). Such advertising 
results in lower prices. In contrast, advertising that reduces marginal adjustment costs more 
in relative terms for inframarginal consumers would result in higher prices. 
< INSERT FIGURE 4 APPROXIMATELY HERE > 
 The theory’s predictions with regard to the shaping effect are consistent with recent 
analysis of the price effects of targeted advertising. Erdem et al. (2008) interpret advertising 
in the traditional sense as a tool for increasing consumers’ willingness to pay (WTP). Under 
that conception, advertising that targets marginal consumers increases their WTP, making the 
demand curve flatter and causing the market price to fall. Meanwhile, advertising that targets 
inframarginal consumers and their WTP makes the demand curve steeper and less elastic, 
resulting in a higher price. Their empirical findings across an array of consumer brands 
reveal the sort of variation in advertising price effects predicted based on their conceptual 
model given the targeting strategies presumably preferred by their managers. 
 Second, according to the proposition, advertising affects prices by moving the 
adjustment map downward, holding constant relative marginal costs of adjustment across 
consumers. I refer to this effect as the “intensification effect,” in that it intensifies the 
influence that the adjustment process itself has on prices; it does this by, in effect, making all 
consumers better at – and therefore more intensely involved in – adjustment. This effect has 
no counterpart in Erdem et al.’s conceptual analysis of traditional persuasive advertising. It is 
an effect that depends uniquely on the peculiar nature of adjustment and one therefore that 
becomes apparent only when one conceives of advertising as facilitating self-persuasion.  
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 The sign of the intensification effect depends on the post-advertising shape of the 
adjustment map. Consider the two panels of Figure 5. The first panel shows a symmetric 
adjustment map in which the curves grow flatter, at first, as one moves from xE
*  toward 
positions of stronger initial preference. The second panel shows a symmetric map in which 
the curves grow steeper. In the first case, a price increase for one of the products would move 
to the margin previously-inframarginal consumers who find adjustment more productive at 
improving their attitude than the consumer at xE
* . These consumers, if they switched 
products, would forgo lower total costs (i.e., transportation plus adjustment costs) from the 
product they left than would the consumer at xE
* . Given symmetry, they would also incur 
greater total costs from their new product relative to the consumer at xE
* . Thus demand is less 
price-sensitive, all else equal, when the adjustment map has this particular shape. Since 
advertising intensifies adjustment, it would intensify adjustment’s reduction of price 
sensitivity in this case, causing prices to rise, all else equal. 
< INSERT FIGURE 5 APPROXIMATELY HERE > 
 In the second case, a price increase moves to the margin previously-inframarginal 
consumers who find adjustment less productive than the consumer at xE
* . These consumers, 
if they switched products, would forgo greater total costs from the product they left than 
would the consumer at xE
* . An adjustment map with this particular shape sets up an increased 
incentive for switching, whence demand becomes more price-sensitive. Since advertising 
intensifies adjustment, it would intensify adjustment’s increase in price sensitivity in this 
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case, causing prices to fall, all else equal.8 The example of the intensification effect shown in 
Figure 4 is of this variety: advertising-induced movement from the solid blue to dashed blue 
adjustment map represents an intensification of price-sensitivity-increasing adjustment and 
would cause prices to fall. 
 The patterns of marginal adjustment cost represented by the maps shown in the two 
panels of Figure 5 signify contrasting views as to what psychological processes dominate 
adjustment. The top panel, displaying adjustment maps that flatten toward positions of 
extreme preference, suggests that adjustment proceeds based on the halo effect – a well-
established tendency by which individuals in certain situations tend to infer unknown 
objective, or undecided subjective, qualities of an object from their overall impressions. 
According to the halo effect, a positive impression about an object causes the individual to 
fill in the unformed aspects of his attitude toward it more positively; a negative impression 
has the opposite effect. Consumers whose judgments about products are characterized by the 
halo effect would thus find adjustment easier the stronger their initial preference for a 
product; that is, a strong positive initial impression would facilitate the building of yet a 
stronger positive attitude. 
 The bottom panel, displaying adjustment maps that steepen toward positions of 
extreme preference, proposes that adjustment proceeds according to regression to the mean 
(RTTM). Rather than proposing adjustment as being skewed deterministically by existing 
attitude, this conception casts adjustment as part of a learning process whereby random 
exposures to information provide the raw material for attitude change. If individuals are 
                                                
8 Note that what is critical to our result in both cases is what happens near xE
* ; in both cases, the curves must 
eventually become increasingly steep as one approaches x = 0  or x = 1 , as this follows from our limiting 
assumptions on the g j ,k . 
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given access to the same information, then those with an initially weak preference for an 
object possess the greatest unexploited opportunities to adjust. These individuals should find 
adjustment easier. Individuals with the most intense initial preferences, in contrast, have 
exhausted the most persuasive information and arguments and should find further adjustment 
relatively more costly. Thus final preferences should tend to converge toward a “mean.” 
 Note that the effects of adjustment-facilitating advertising on price sensitivity and 
price levels that we have just derived based on the model’s assumptions do not depend on the 
distribution of consumers. They depend only (1) how the progression of marginal adjustment 
costs of consumers over the adjustment process varies depending upon strength of their 
initial preferences, as represented by the shape of the adjustment map; and (2) which 




 Let us consider now how the level of adjustment-facilitating advertising chosen by 
the firms in equilibrium varies relative to the welfare optimum. The benchmark level is 
obtained when A0,A1( )  are chosen to maximize 
(8) W ≡WCS +Π0 +Π1 ≡WCS +ΠT   
where consumer surplus is measured as the aggregation of utility across the mass of 
consumers, based on (3) and (4), 
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(9) 
WCS = V − p0 − t x − i
*0 x,A0,r( )⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ − g0 i, x,A0,r( )di
0













V − p1 − t 1− x − i














= p1 − p0 + t( )xE* + ti*0 x,A0,r( )− g0 i, x,A0,r( )di
0













V − p1 − t2 − txE















Comparing these to the privately-chosen levels of advertising yields the following result: 
 
PROPOSITION 3 (Welfare – General): Assume (1) f x( ) = f 1− x( )  and (2) 
g0,k i, x( ) = g1,k i,1− x( )∀i ≥ 0, x ∈ 0,1[ ] . Then if  
 1











































is positive, the firms advertise too much; if it is negative, they advertise too little. 
 
 Proposition 3 indicates generally that the wedge between private incentives and the 
social net benefits of advertising accrues to the conflict inherent in the firm’s focus on 
winning the marginal consumer versus social welfare’s dependence on the sum of benefits 
across all consumers. Consistent with this, the first term shows that the density of consumers 
at the margin (i.e., midpoint in the symmetric case) mediates the role of advertising’s price 
effect in the divergence between private and social net benefits. The firm’s desire to advertise 
more when doing so increases prices drives the greatest wedge relative to social net benefits 
when the density of consumers at the midpoint is lowest. In this situation, the firm weighs the 
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low cost of losing sales to sparse marginal consumers against the high revenue benefit of 
raising prices on inframarginal consumers. When instead the density of consumers at the 
midpoint is greater, the firm’s incentives not to lose sales to marginal consumers align more 
closely with the social welfare objective of keeping prices low across all consumers. Along 
similar lines, the second and third terms show the private-social gap widening when 
advertising’s “efficiency” effect of reducing accumulated adjustment costs accrues more to 
the benefit of marginal consumers relative to the mass of consumers. Advertising benefits 
enjoyed by consumers at the margin are readily recaptured by the firm through incremental 
sales and increased prices. Benefits accruing to inframarginal consumers are irrelevant to 
sales or to the possibility of incrementing price. 
 To obtain a more intuitive understanding of the proposition, let us now consider how 
private and social incentives for advertising diverge in a benchmark case. 
 
PROPOSITION 4 (Welfare – Benchmark Case): Consider the case in which the benefit 
accruing to the marginal consumer from advertising is twice the average consumer benefit. 
Then firms advertise too much if the price effect of advertising is positive and too little if it is 
negative. 
 
 It can be seen easily that the special case proposed in Proposition 4 is one in which 
the last two terms in the lemma are equal and drop out and, consequently, the welfare 
conclusions are simplified. What does this signify? The benchmark represents the particular 
relative level of benefit accruing to the marginal consumer at which the value firms are able 
to recoup through marginal sales gain from advertising exactly balances the social benefit 
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that accrues to advertising across the mass of consumers. This leaves firms’ net benefit from 
advertising’s effect on prices as the sole private source of motivation for advertising that has 
no counterpart in social benefit. Thus when advertising increases prices firms are motivated 
to advertise too much, and when it decreases prices they are motivated to advertise too little. 
The case arises if the benefit from advertising declines linearly from that accruing to the 
marginal consumer at x = 12  to the consumer with extreme preference for either product 0 or 
1, who reaps no benefit from advertising because his adjustment productivity is fixed at zero.  
 One can easily construct from the benchmark an alternative case in which advertising 
has no price effect but is under-provided in equilibrium. Consider a RTTM pattern 
adjustment map like the one in the bottom of Figure 5. From Assumption 5 it follows that the 
consumer at x = 12  is adjusting less than double the amount the consumer at x = 14  is 
adjusting; she in turn is adjusting less than double the amount of the consumer at x = 18 , and 
so forth. Thus the benefit accruing to the x = 12  consumer from advertising that simply moves 
the adjustment map downward without affecting its shape is less than double that of the 
average consumer. This suggests firms would advertise too little in such a case even when 
the price effect of advertising is zero. As we know, however, pure intensification advertising 
reduces price under the RTTM pattern. Instead suppose we consider advertising that targets 
inframarginal consumers such that it shifts the adjustment map from a RTTM pattern to a 
neutral pattern. Based on Proposition 2, such advertising increases price. Therefore there 
exists advertising that moderately targets inframarginal consumers that would be price 
neutral, as illustrated in Figure 6. Because the benefits of the advertising are distributed more 
toward the inframarginal consumers relative to pure intensification advertising, the firms 
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incentives to under-provide are increased. Thus such advertising is under-provided in 
equilibrium. 
< INSERT FIGURE 6 APPROXIMATELY HERE > 
 
V.  CONCLUSION 
 
 The paper has offered a theory of persuasive advertising as a phenomenon distinct 
from informative advertising and with its own efficient purpose. The updated conception of 
advertising’s role arises from a new model of consumer behavior that recognizes the 
phenomenon of adjustment to choice. When rational consumers desire to adjust to their 
choices, it becomes possible to conceive of how persuasion might influence them. The 
influence is, indeed, consensual. 
 Traditional advertising theory has predicted conflicting price effects for advertising, 
accruing to the increased market power of brands on the one hand (the effect of advertising 
as persuasion) and to increased consumer access to price and product information on the 
other (the effect of advertising as information). Accordingly predictions of global effects 
based on advertising are often misleading. Recent empirical efforts, such as Erdem et al. 
(2008), have therefore sought a more complex understanding by focusing on how advertising 
differentially influences the willingness of pay of different groups of consumers. 
 The recent methodological advances in the empirical analysis of advertising’s effects 
have created an opportunity for rich theories to advance complex hypotheses of effects that 
can more accurately describe reality than past conceptions. Here the present model has 
offered two notable advances, which we consider in the context of Erdem et al.’s (2008) 
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important findings. First, it provides a framework, based on the conception of advertising as 
assisting self-persuasion, for predicting an array of differential price effects attributable to 
consumer heterogeneity. These effects can accrue not only to differential targeting of 
different groups of consumers, as posited by Erdem et al. (2008), but also to different 
response tendencies to the same advertising by consumers with different levels of initial 
preference for a brand. The theoretical bases for variations in consumers’ adjustment facility 
by preference intensity level suggested in section III – the halo effect and preference 
regression to the mean – provide some examples of how the model may be applied. Such 
conceptions may then be taken to data. With new approaches, including neural data, it may 
be possible to observe sources of heterogeneity in consumers’ responses and so test the 
theory’s predictions in ways not previously possible. 
 Second, the model offers a general structure for looking at how advertising that 
assists adjustment can shape the heterogeneous responses of different consumers 
differentially. In doing so, it can advance testable hypotheses for the price effects of complex 
advertising strategies that target different messages at different audiences. Thus whereas 
Erdem et al. (2008) consider the special implications of Heinz’ “horizontal” strategy, future 
empirical studies might use the present model as a basis for examining the impacts of 
multifarious campaigns.  
 This paper has only initiated the process of understanding the implications of 
consumer adjustment, and there are numerous opportunities for further research. I focus here 
on just a few interesting avenues relating to advertising’s role. First, it would be helpful not 
just to understand the general welfare implications of adjustment-facilitating advertising, but 
also the determinants of which consumers benefit. Second, while I have focused on the 
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symmetric case with respect to price effects, it would be useful to study how advertising 
affects pricing and competition in the case where the market is biased in favor of one of the 
firms. How does a dominant firm use adjustment-facilitating advertising versus how an 
upstart firm might use it? What are the implications for equilibrium pricing and welfare when 
the market is lopsided? 
 Third, it would be informative to extend the model to consider firms having a choice 
among advertising strategies that shape the adjustment map in different ways. This 
conception is realistic and could be revealing with respect to a number of welfare-relevant 
phenomena. Consider, for example, a case in which advertising reduces adjustment costs and 
flattens adjustment curves. One might characterize three strategic options for the firm: (i) 
target all consumers with the advertising, (ii) target only inframarginal consumers, or (iii) 
target only consumers at or near the margin. Figure 7 illustrates the three cases and their 
effects on the adjustment map: the dashed red curves show the pre-advertising map, while the 
solid blue curves show the post-advertising map. Which strategy would the firms choose? 
Would the choice depend upon certain parameter values? What is interesting in this scenario 
is the possibility that the firms might prefer (ii) to (i). We know from Proposition 2 that the 
adjustment map resulting from (ii) entails higher prices. On this basis, it would not be 
surprising if the firms favor it. If they do, a “shrouding equilibrium” could result in which the 
firms and perhaps some consumers benefit substantially from advertising, while those 
consumers that are indifferent between the products are left “in the dark” and experience far 
less benefit. (If the price increase due to advertising is large enough, all consumers may be 
worse off.) Note that, if (ii) is preferred by firms in Nash equilibrium, it is a dominant 
strategy, meaning neither firm would have an independent incentive to enlighten the median 
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consumers. Thus, as in other scenarios involving shrouding equilibria (e.g., Gabaix and 
Laibson 2006), a suboptimal outcome results despite competition in the market. 




A. Applicability of log concavity of F .( )  in pj   
 In this section, I will show that log concavity of F .( )  in p0  – a critical condition for 
the existence of an interior equilibrium in prices – may be met (1) for the general class of 
symmetric adjustment map pairs for any log concave distribution f, and (2) for an example of 
a non-symmetric adjustment map pair when f is Beta distributed with shape parameters 
α ,β( ) = 3,3( ) . The main issue in the case of non-symmetric map pairs is that, approaching 
the extreme locations x = 0  and x = 1 , consumers’ marginal adjustment costs approach 
infinity for the nearby product. Thus, unless marginal adjustment costs for the distant product 
similarly grow without limit, sensitivity of demand to price rises precipitously at the 
extremes, making it potentially profitable for firms to attempt to drop price from any 
candidate interior maximum to a low enough level to take the whole market. This situation is 
avoided if the density of consumers at the extremes is sufficiently low, as with some log-
concave distributions such as the Beta. So, to summarize, an interior price equilibrium will 
result whenever the incentive to de-stabilize such an equilibrium is mitigated by adjustment 
symmetry; or when there are not enough consumers with extreme tastes for firms to want to 
de-stabilize an interior price equilibrium despite non-symmetry. 
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 We may define the log concavity of F .( )  in p0  as f xE*( ) ∂xE*∂ p0 F xE*( )  being decreasing 
in p0  or, equivalently, −F xE
*( ) f xE*( ) ∂xE*∂ p0  decreasing in p0 . Suppose first that F .( )  is log 
concave in its own argument x; then ∂2 xE
* ∂p0
2 < 0  is then a sufficient condition for log 



























































































































We note in (A7) that ∂xE
*
∂ p0  is not a function of i, so it may be pulled outside the integral, 































∫ ≤ 0   
 Consider now the set of pairs of symmetric adjustment maps,  G
0,0 ,G 1,0{ } . For these 
pairs, for each adjustment curve in  G
0,0  corresponding to a given location x ∈ 0,1( ) , the 
corresponding curve in  G
1,0  would be its mirror image about x. An example of a (sub)set of 
such a map pairs, for j = 0,1  and ρ ∈ −1,1[ ] , is given by 
(A2) g j ,0 =
x
2 x−i( )                    for x ∈ 0, 14[ ]
ρx
2 x−i( ) +
1−ρ
2−8i           for x ∈ 14 , 12[ ]
ρ 1−x( )
2 1−x−i( ) +
1−ρ
2−8i         for x ∈ 12 , 34[ ]
1−x











Two example map pairs from this set are displayed in Figure 8, corresponding to the values 
ρ = 1  and ρ = −1 . In the first example (with ρ = 1 ), adjustment curves in both maps flatten 
monotonely as one moves toward the midline x = 12 . These maps conceive of consumers 
quite intuitively as being more facile with adjustment to both options if they are initially 
more indifferent between their options; consumers who feel strongly about an option initially 
are less able to find good opportunities to adjust to either their preferred option, because they 
are already almost perfectly satisfied with it; or its alternative, because they simply find it 
hard to conceive of how they might get comfortable with that distant option. One may verify 
that for these ∂g
j ,0
∂x < 0  for x ∈ 0, 12[ ] , while ∂g j ,0∂x > 0  for x ∈ 12 ,1[ ] . In the second example 
(with ρ = −1), adjustment curves flatten at first toward the midline, but then (beyond 
x = 14  or x = 34 ) steepen to reach a local maximum steepness at x = 12 . These maps conceive 
of the most indifferent consumers as being more rigid than those just a bit closer to one 
option or another; perhaps consumers the most initially dissatisfied with their options become 
pig-headed or embittered and therefore are inflexible. One may verify that for these ∂g
j ,0
∂x < 0  
for x ∈ 0, 14[ ]  and x ∈ 12 , 34[ ] , while ∂g j ,0∂x > 0  for x ∈ 14 , 12[ ]  and x ∈ 34 ,1[ ] . 
<INSERT FIGURE 8 APPROXIMATELY HERE> 












*2 , (iii) i*0,0 = i*1,0 , and (iv) ix
*0,0 = ix
*1,0 . It may be verified, based on 
these, that the sufficient condition (A1) above for log concavity is met. That is, we have log 
concavity of F x p0( )( )  for any log concave distribution f. 


















*( )   
for log concavity of F .( )  in p0 . Consider now an example of a non-symmetric adjustment 
map pair, given by g0,0 i, x( ) ≡ x 2 x − i( )  and g1,0 i, x( ) ≡ 1− x( ) 2 1− x − i( )  for x ∈ 0,1[ ] . 
These functions have the property that g0,0 0, x( ) = g1,0 0, x( ) = 1 2 . Observe further that 
i*0,0 x,t( ) = 2t−12t x  is defined for t ≥ 12 , whence i* < x ; similarly i*1,0 x,t( ) = 2t−12t 1− x( ) , whence 
i* <1− x . We also have ix
*0,0 = 2t−12t  and ix
*1,0 = − 2t−12t . Let us now take the first and second 





2 x − i( )2




x − i( )3
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1− x − i( )3
≥ 0   
Now we evaluate (A1) at i = 0  (i.e., the position at which the indifferent consumer evaluates 
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4t 2 − 4t +1( ) 2x −1( )
2x 1− x( )
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Substituting into (A7) for our example functions we obtain ∂xE
*
∂ p0 = −1 1− ln
1
2t( ) . 
 Now assume f is distributed Beta with shape parameters α ,β( ) = 3,3( ) . We have: 
 
f x( ) = x 1− x( )⎡⎣ ⎤⎦
2






;  F x( ) =












⇒ f ' x( ) = 2x 1− x( ) 1− 2x( )

















2x 1− x( ) 1− 2x( )
x 1− x( )⎡⎣ ⎤⎦
2 −
x 1− x( )⎡⎣ ⎤⎦
2







2 1− 2x( )
x 1− x( ) −
30 1− x[ ]2
x 6x2 −15x +10⎡⎣ ⎤⎦
  
One may verify, using (A4), (A5), and ∂xE
*
∂ p0 = −1 1− ln
1
2t( ) , that (A3) holds for all x ∈ 0,1( ) , 
and for any t > 12 . 
 
B. Proofs and Derivations of Lemmas, Propositions, and Remarks 
B1. DERIVATION OF LEMMA 1. 
  Begin with the expression g j i* j x,t,θ ,Aj ,rj( ),θ , x,Aj ,rj( ) = t  which implicitly defines 
i* j  and expand (here, shown for j = 0 , with the arguments of i suppressed and g suppressed 
but for i and x): 
 φ A0( )r g0,1 i*0, x( )− g0,0 i*0, x( )⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ + g0,0 i*0, x( )− t = 0   





0 di*0 = −gA0
0 dA0 − gr
0dr − gx
0dx − gθ
0dθ + dt ⇔
g
i*0
0 di*0 = − φA0r g
0,1 − g0,0( ){ }dA0 − φ A0( ) g0,1 − g0,0( ){ }dr − gx0dx − dθ + dt   
Using Cramer’s rule, it follows from Assumption 7 that 
 ix










0 = 1   
Also using Cramer’s rule one obtains 
 iA0







0,0 − g0,1( )
g
i*0
0 ≥ 0   
whence it follows from Assumption 5 that lim
A0→∞
iA0
*0 = 0 . Additionally, 
 ir





φ A0( ) g0,0 − g0,1( )
g
i*0
0 ≥ 0   
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0 < 0  
Corresponding results can be derived along the same lines for j = 1 . 
 
B2. PROOF OF LEMMA 2. 
 The proof is an extension of the proof of Bloch and Manceau’s (1999) Lemma 1. 
Assume no advertising, and suppose that the market is not covered, that is, at equilibrium 
prices p0
*, p1
*( )  there exists a consumer x for whom 
 
V − p0
* − t x − i*0,0 x( )⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ − g0,0 i, x( )di
0
i*0,0 x( )
∫ < 0    and 
V − p1






One can show these prices do not constitute a Nash equilibrium, in that firm 0 can increase 
its profit by lowering its price p0  without altering the profit, hence strategy, of firm 1. Begin 
by noting that, under p0
*, p1
*( ) , because there is a consumer for whom neither good provides 
nonnegative utility somewhere between the firms, the profit of firm 0 can be written 
 Π0 = p0












F x0( )   
where x0  is the position of the consumer who, at prices p0
*, p1
*( ) , is just indifferent between 
buying product 0 and buying nothing. By assumption, ∂Π0 ∂x0 > 0 . Now note that  
 
∂p0 ∂x0 = −t + tix




















= −t + g i*0,0 x0( ), x0( )− g 0, x0( ) = −g 0, x0( ) < 0
 
which follows from Assumption 7. Since ∂Π0 ∂x0 = ∂Π0 ∂p0( ) ∂p0 ∂x0( ) , it follows that 
∂Π0 ∂p0 < 0 . Therefore a small downward deviation in the price p0  from p0
*  increases firm 
0’s profits while not affecting firm 1’s profits. This contradicts the assertion that p0
*, p1
*( )  
constitute an equilibrium. 
 Since the market is covered when there is no advertising, it follows that it is also 
covered when there is advertising. 
 
B3. PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1. 
 Let us begin by considering the firms’ Nash price-setting strategies at t = 2 . 










































< 0   
 Using (A6), one obtains ∂Π0 ∂p0( ) p0=0 = F xE
*( )
p0=0
> 0 : non-zero demand for 
product 0 is guaranteed at p0 = 0  by t > 0  and g
j i, x( ) > 0 . Moreover, 
∂Π0 ∂p0( ) p0 xE* =0 = p0 f 0( ) ∂xE
* ∂p0( ) < 0 , where p0 xE* =0 > 0 . Because, following from 
Assumption 8, −F xE
*( ) f xE*( ) ∂xE*∂ p0  must be decreasing in p0 , it follows that there exists a 
unique solution to the first-order condition ∂Π0∂ p0 = 0  and that it is p0
* = −F xE
*( ) f xE*( ) ∂xE*∂ p0 . A 
corresponding analysis of firm 1’s problem yields the unique solution to the first-order 
condition ∂Π1∂ p1 = 0  at p1
* = 1− F xE
*( )⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ f xE*( ) ∂xE
*
∂ p1 .  
 Now consider the firms’ advertising choices at t = 1 . We focus on analyzing firm 0’s 
problem. Differentiating firm 0’s profit equation in (6) with respect to A0  yields 
(A8) ∂Π0
∂A0























*( )− a  
Firm 0 knows it will choose price optimally at t = 2  taking its advertising choice as given; 
accordingly the first-order condition for firm 0’s advertising decision involves substituting 
the first-order condition for price and the expression p0
* = −F xE
*( ) f xE*( ) ∂xE*∂ p0  into (A8) and 









∂A0( )− a   
which is the sum of advertising’s effect on revenue through the prices of both firms. (The 
direct effect of advertising on 0’s sales drops out due to the envelope theorem.) 
 It can be shown easily that the marginal revenue product of firm 0’s advertising – the 
first term in (A9) - is a linear function of φA0 . Thus it is necessary only that the first unit of 
advertising be sufficiently productive (i.e., φA0 A0=0
 sufficiently large) and the marginal 
revenue product of advertising be positive for ∂Π0 ∂A0 > 0  at A0 = 0 . [By manipulating 
(A9); establishing that there exists A0  such that, for A0 > A0 , ∂Π0 ∂A0 < 0 ; and establishing 
the conditions under which under which ∂2Π0 ∂A0
2 < 0 , we may show.] Our first task, then, 
is to establish the equivalence of pre-condition (iii) of the proposition to a positive marginal 
revenue product of advertising for firm 0 (and, by extension, the equivalence of (iv) to a 
positive marginal revenue product of advertising for firm 1). 
 We may derive an expression for ∂ p1∂Aj  by totally differentiating the first-order 










∂Aj + p1 f xE
*( ) ∂2 xE*∂ p1∂Aj
∂xE
*
∂ p1 2 f xE
*( ) + p1 f ' xE*( ) ∂xE*∂ p1{ }+ p1 f xE*( ) ∂2 xE*∂ p12
  
Using this, and ∂xE
*
∂ p1 = −
∂xE
*

























∂ p1( ){ }
∂xE
*
∂ p1 2 f xE
*( ) + p1 f ' xE*( ) ∂xE*∂ p1{ }+ p1 f xE*( ) ∂2 xE*∂ p12
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Because the denominator is known to be positive by the second-order conditions for a 
maximum in price, signing this expression positive is equivalent to signing the curly-
bracketed expression negative. 
 Recalling from Proposition 1 that p1
* = 1− F xE
*( )⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ f xE*( ) ∂xE
*
∂ p1 , the curly bracketed 










*( ) ∂xE*∂ p1
−
1− F xE
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These allow us to relate ∂
2 xE
*











































∂ p1( )2   
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0,1 − g0,0⎡⎣ ⎤⎦di
0
i*0 xE































* ,A0 ,r( )
∫   
Using this expression, along with (A15) and ∂xE
*
∂ p1 = −
∂xE
*
∂ p0 , we obtain as a necessary condition 






























* ,A0 ,r( )
∫   
Analogous analytics show that the marginal revenue product of advertising for firm 1 is 































∫   
 It remains to show the proposition follows from pre-condition (ii). We have already 
established that a positive marginal revenue product of advertising and  φA0 A0=0
 large enough 
imply ∂Π0 ∂A0 > 0 at A0 = 0 . Meanwhile, by Assumption 3 and Lemma 1, respectively, as 
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A0  grows large, φA0  and iA0
*0  approach zero. Inspection of (A16) and (A10) reveals that the 
components of the marginal revenue product of advertising that multiply φA0  are bounded 
above with respect to increases in A0 > 0 , implying that there exists A0  such that, for 
A0 > A0 , ∂Π0 ∂A0 < 0 . Because the marginal revenue product of advertising is a linear 
function of φA0 , this term will decline monotonely with A0  if φA0 declines quickly enough 
with A0 . Thus, for φ  sufficiently concave, ∂
2Π0 ∂A0
2 < 0  is guaranteed, whence, given 





*( )  with A0*,A1* > 0 . 
 
B4. PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2 
 To sign the effect of a on price, begin by observing that in the symmetric case 
∂A0 ∂a = ∂A1 ∂a < 0 . The other components of (7) are obtained by totally differentiating the 
first-order condition in price for firm 0 (which is obtained by setting (A6) equal to zero) and 










∂ p1 + p0 f xE
*( ) ∂2 xE*∂ p0 ∂ p1
∂xE
*
∂ p0 2 f xE
*( ) + p0 f ' xE*( ) ∂xE*∂ p0{ }+ p0 f xE*( ) ∂2 xE*∂ p02
  










∂Aj + p0 f xE
*( ) ∂2 xE*∂ p0 ∂Aj
∂xE
*
∂ p0 2 f xE
*( ) + p0 f ' xE*( ) ∂xE*∂ p0{ }+ p0 f xE*( ) ∂2 xE*∂ p02
  
(A10) provides an analogous expression for firm 1’s pricing decision with respect to changes 
in advertising. 
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 When incorporating these expressions in the evaluation of (7), certain other facts will 








2 = − ∂
2 xE
*




∂ p0 ∂A0 = −
∂2 xE
*
∂ p1∂A0 , 









































































Additionally, under the symmetric case, xE
* = 12 , whence f ' xE
*( ) = 0 , F xE*( ) = 1− F xE*( ) = 12 , 
and ∂xE
* ∂A0 = −∂xE
* ∂A1  (using (A16)). Using these facts, ∂p0 ∂p1 = 12 . 

























∫ < 0 ), the numerators of ∂
2 xE
*
∂ p0 ∂A0  and 
∂2 xE
*
∂ p0 ∂A1  are both increased 
by the same positive quantity, whereby it follows that ∂p0 ∂A0 > −∂p0 ∂A1 . By symmetry, 
∂p1 ∂A1 > −∂p1 ∂A0 . Thus the second and third pair of terms in (7) are both positive in this 
























∫ < 0 ). 
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∫ > 0 ). Then the numerators of ∂
2 xE
*
∂ p0 ∂A0  and 
∂2 xE
*
∂ p0 ∂A1  are both decreased by 
the same positive quantity, whereby ∂p0 ∂A0 < −∂p0 ∂A1 and, by symmetry, 
























∫ > 0 ). 
 
B5.  PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3. 
 The welfare-maximizing social planner sets A0,A1  simultaneously to maximize W as 
given in (8). Based on (9), the derivatives of total profits j = 0,1( )  and consumer surplus 




= ∂ p0∂Aj F xE
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* + ti*0 xE
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Thus the first-order condition with respect to the planner’s choice of firm 0’s advertising 
level simplifies to 
(A19) 
t 1− 2xE
* + i*0 xE






































+ ∂ p1∂A0 −
∂ p0











∫ dx = a
  
Under symmetry, all but the last term of (A19) drops out. An analogous expression 
corresponds to firm 1’s advertising. 
 Meanwhile, recall that firm 0 chooses to advertise to the point represented by the 
first-order conditions of its profit maximization, to wit, 
 p0 f xE









∂A0( ) + ∂ p0∂A0 F xE*( ) = a   
So social desirability of the level of advertising chosen by firm 0 depends on the sign of 
(A20) p0 f xE
















∫ dx   
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If positive, then the firm advertises too much; if negative, too little. 
 We may simplify (A20) by noting that, similar to the expressions (A18), but 


















































































∂ p1∂A0 = −
∂2 xE
*






























Substituting these expressions into (A20) yields ∂ p0∂A0 F xE







∫ dx . Finally, we can use 
(A16), (A21), F xE
*( ) = 12 , the Corollary to Proposition 6, and, based on Proposition 1, 
p0
* = −1 2 f xE



























































































































































which takes the same sign as the expression given in the statement of the proposition. 
 
B6. PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4. 
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